Abstract Stories about climate change garner passionate comments from readers, ranging from acclaim to invective. This research is the first to investigate the effects of the rhetorical strategies of deploying anecdotal versus scientific evidence in comments. A between-subjects experiment with a U.S. adult sample (N = 363) tested whether user comments that support or contradict a climate news story, using either anecdotal or scientific evidence, have an effect on message reception. Individual difference variables in audience members have been shown to moderate the effects of comments in previous research. Findings show that political ideology is an important moderator of effects, particularly on the perception of climate change risk and story credibility. And when looking at the reactions of people who have low need for cognition and are highly conservative, climate uncertainty was diminished when anecdotal evidence appeared in comments. Taken together, these findings indicate that, in the context of climate change communication, comments from users can influence whether a climate story is perceived as credible by certain readers and can also disrupt a story's intended message, particularly if comments attempt to invoke scientific proof for their claims.
1 Literature review
Online commenting on news and science stories
The advent of the Internet and the transition to online news have been accompanied by the emergence of a more interactive venue to solicit reader feedback: online commenting forums (Santana 2014) . A type of user-generated content, online comments have made the news consumption experience more engaging, participatory, and deliberative (Collins and Nerlich 2015; Hermida and Thurman 2008) . Whether commenters contribute to informed online discourse is unclear. Indeed, incivility has been found to be a problem in anonymous commenting forums (Santana 2014) , and journalists disdain the anonymity (Reader 2012) . Other problems noted with online comments include negative commentary such as challenging the credibility of the story by drawing on personal experiences, attacking the journalist, offering irrational arguments, and misinterpreting story facts (Koteyko et al. 2013; Secko et al. 2011) .
Although comments are posted by vocal members of the audience, and are therefore, not representative of the views of the larger public, readers draw on comments to judge public opinion about an issue (Lee and Jang 2010) . One study found when exposed to dissenting comments (i.e., comments opposing the news story angle), subjects perceived public opinion as discrepant from the position taken by the news story as compared to those subjects who were exposed only to the news story (Lee and Jang 2010) . Further, studies have found comments influence not only readers' perceptions of public opinion about an issue but also their own personal opinions about an issue (Kim and Sun 2006; Lee and Sung 2007) . Behavioral intentions and attitudes after viewing pro-and anti-vaccine public service announcements have been influenced by commenters' claims (Kareklas et al. 2015) . Exposure to uncivil comments about nanotechnology resulted in greater risk perception than exposure to civil comments (Anderson et al. 2014) . In addition, when exposed to negative comments, individuals with low need for cognition moved away from the opinion expressed in the story (Lee and Jang 2010) . Need for cognition refers to how much a person gravitates toward effortful thinking, which in turn motivates how they engage with information (Cacioppo and Petty 1982) . Further exploration of varying comment factors that influence reception is necessary.
Persuasive effects of exemplars and anecdotal evidence
Anecdotal evidence, Balso called story, narrative, case, or exemplar^ (Greene et al. 2010) , appears alongside other types of evidence such as statistical base-rate information, expert interviews, and empirical scientific work. Whether in journalism or strategic communication, and whether the anecdote is about a real person or fictitious, information about an individual who has encountered a phenomenon can have a powerful influence on audience members.
Researchers have examined how these anecdotal exemplars affect understanding, behavior, and attitude, and they are nearly always preferred by audience members and are more persuasive than base-rate information. This phenomenon is captured by exemplification theory (Zillmann 1999; Zillmann 2002) , which shows how beliefs are modified by exposure to anecdotes about individuals that represent (exemplify) a whole phenomenon, condition, or issue. Research has shown anecdotal exemplars (whether in text or imagery) cause audience members to form enduring beliefs about risks, even when quantifications in the same story indicate an opposing reality (Zillmann et al. 1996) . A meta-analysis found when message recipients encounter an anecdotal example that is counter to the base-rate information, they misinterpreted information (Allen et al. 2006) . Another meta-analysis, however, found statistical and causal evidence to be more persuasive than anecdotal evidence (Hornikx 2005) . As to why anecdotes function differently, BConcrete, personal or vicariously related experience is processed by the experiential system and the generated affect is an effective motivator of action^ (Marx et al. 2007 ). The experiential system, according to Marx et al. 2007 , is the mechanism by which people process information by relating current situations to memories of experiences. In science stories, exemplars have been shown to attract attention from people who are empathic, while also deterring people who have high numeracy (KnoblochWesterwick et al. 2015) .
The research about narratives also shows mixed effects. Narratives refer to any information presented in story form, whereas anecdotes and exemplars refer to a specific individual's experience and are usually brief. A meta-analysis about health campaigns found that statistical evidence has more influence on beliefs and attitudes, while narrative evidence has more influence on behavioral intention (Zebregs et al. 2014) . One specific study comparing statistical and narrative evidence about global warming found statistical evidence to be more persuasive, but the narrative tested was a story about deforestation and didn't provide a Bhuman^face with the information (Kim et al. 2012) . Similarly, another study examined the effects of climate change Bpolicy narratives,^wherein corporations or groups are the heroes and villains (not a lay individual), and found them to be no more persuasive than lists of facts (Jones 2014) . Dahlstrom (2014) advocates using narratives with nonexpert audiences in order to increase comprehension and acceptance of normative evaluations. Moreover, narratives can make a scientific hypothetical real and localize environmental degradation, thereby reducing uncertainty about the actuality of environmental harm (Kelly et al. 2014) . Science narratives can aid in explaining complex phenomena and causal processes, leading to a better assessment of risk (Downs 2014) .
Journalists, public health campaigners, and science communicators have been urged to use anecdotal evidence and narratives carefully and ethically (Dahlstrom and Ho 2012; Hinnant et al. 2012; Kreuter et al. 2007 ). However carefully journalists employ anecdotal exemplars, though, user comments appended to stories online may also contain anecdotal information contradicting the story exemplars. This research examines what happens to audience interpretation when commenters deploy anecdotal exemplars that reflect on the article.
With regard to how anecdotes function in comment sections, the research in this area is growing. Peter et al. (2014) manipulated the use of exemplars within comments on a social networking site so that it would appear commenters were sharing attitudes that were either for or against vaccinations. Peter et al. (2014) found user comments in favor of flu vaccination led to a lower perception of risk, positive attitudes toward vaccination, and a stronger intention to be vaccinated than did negative comments. Another study found persuasive strength in comment exemplars that had more power than a story's Blikes^to influence personal attitudes (Winter et al. 2015) .
Uncertainty and risk perception
Two of the concerns about public understanding of science are uncertainty and perception of risk, which are dimensions of climate change engagement (Moser and Dilling 2011) . Zehr (2000) contends that scientific uncertainty operates as a rhetorical wedge between the scientific and public worlds and can lead to inaction by the public. Scientific uncertainty about climate change, which manifests itself in quantifying the probability of future climate predictions (Webster 2003) , is a different phenomenon than public uncertainty, though the former influences the latter (Doyle 2011) . More specifically, informing the public about uncertainty among scientists can cause the public to: inaccurately interpret science and be skeptical about climate change (Corner et al. 2012) ; be less likely to support environmental policies (Ding et al. 2011) ; and be less likely to alter individual environmental behavior (Morton et al. 2011) . Revealing scientific uncertainty, however, doesn't alter public trust in scientists (Retzbach and Maier 2015) . The present experiment focuses on how participants exposed to different types of user comments, which have been shown to skew science in other research (Kata 2012) , experience uncertainty about climate change.
Related to public uncertainty is the perception of risk about climate change. The level of certainty and perceived risk both fell among the American public between 2012 and 2013 (Leiserowitz et al. 2013) . Risk perceptions alone are predictive of behavioral intentions and shouldn't be considered a surrogate for environmental beliefs generally (O'Connor et al. 1999) . Consistent with the information about the power of exemplars or anecdotal experience, personal exposure to climate change (either through one's own experience or those of another) affects risk perceptions via affective reactions (Weber 2010) .
Based on research on the effects of comment valence as well as on studies that show that anecdotal evidence is more persuasive than empirical scientific evidence, this study first inquires about the effect of comments on a news article about climate change: RQ1: What are the combined effects of evidence type (anecdotal vs. scientific) and argument direction (supportive vs. dissenting) on perceptions of story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and perception of risk from climate change?
Individual difference variables that moderate effects
Need for cognition appears to be an important individual difference variable when it comes to examining the effects of anecdotal versus empirical scientific evidence. Compared to individuals with low need for cognition, those with high need for cognition are more likely to engage in systematic processing of persuasive information (Cacioppo et al. 1986 ). Anecdotal information contains information appealing to emotion rather than cognition and is considered to exert persuasive effects via heuristic processing. Individuals with high need for cognition are less likely to be influenced by anecdotal information than individuals with low need for cognition (Zillmann and Brosius 2012) . Also, since messages based on statistics are more convincing when systematic processing is activated (Petty et al. 1981) , individuals with high need for cognition should be more persuaded by scientific than anecdotal information. Indeed, Braverman (2008) found that individuals with low need for cognition were more persuaded by a testimonial message than an informational message. Therefore to discover how an audience member's need for cognition influences responses, the following question asks:
RQ2: Does need for cognition moderate the effect of evidence type on perception of story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and perception of risk from climate change?
In addition to a person's need for cognition, personal opinions, such as political ideology or environmental values, are also powerful predictors of uncertainty about climate change and perceptions of risk (Smith and Leiserowitz 2012) . In a random sample of U. K. adults, Whitmarsh (2011) found that conservative political affiliation influenced not just skepticism that climate change was occurring but also Bperceptions of the credibility and meaning of evidence, and of the trustworthiness of communicators of climate change information^(p. 697). Leiserowitz (2006) found that liberals, along with females, minorities, and newspaper readers, perceived climate change as a greater risk. In addition, pre-existing beliefs about climate change shape processing of messages. Therefore, to understand how an audience member's political inclinations could shape how anecdotal vs. scientific information within comments affects them, the following question is posed:
RQ3: Does political ideology moderate the effect of evidence type on perceptions of story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and risk from climate change?
Finally, to assess how need for cognition and political ideology together influence message reception, the following question asks:
RQ4: Does need for cognition moderate the interaction effect of political ideology and evidence type on perceptions of story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and perception of risk from climate change?
Methodology

Design
The experiment used a 2 (supporting comments vs. dissenting comments) × 2 (anecdotal evidence vs. scientific evidence referenced in comments) between-subjects design. A priori power analysis, indicated a sample size of 199 for 80 % power to detect a medium-sized effect at α = .05.
Participants
A sample of 400 American adults older than 18 (M age = 35.73, SD = 11.51, range: 19-76) was recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk website. Research has found this online marketplace to be a viable way to collect survey data (Behrend et al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010; Rand 2012) , with liberals in the MTurk sample expected to hold slightly more liberal values than liberals in mass public (Clifford et al. 2015) . Although the population might have been disproportionally liberal and affiliated more often with Democrats (Krupnikov and Levine 2014) , random assignment to experimental treatment should have equally distributed the political variation among conditions. A more liberal sample could have led to less variation in how participants responded to the dependent variables.
Data were screened for univariate and multivariate outliers. Data were deleted from: 28 participants who got the induction-check wrong and 9 participants who completed the study in fewer than five minutes. Data from the remaining 363 participants were included.
Participants were offered $1 to complete a 15-min online survey (administered using Qualtrics) where they were asked to read a news article and comments and then answer questions.
Among participants, 53.2 % were male, 46.6 % were female, and .3 % preferred not to answer. Most participants were white (n = 287; 79.1 %), 22 (6.1 %) were black or African American, 17 (4.7 %) were Latino or Hispanic, 26 (7.2 %) were Asian, 10 (2.8 %) selected Bother,^and 1 (.3 %) chose not to report.
Stimuli/procedure
Story Participants all viewed the same news story, with one of four sets of comments. The news story appeared to be from the Associated Press and was about environmental health impacts as predicted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Previous scholarship has tested other story frames, such as: gain/loss (Spence and Pidgeon 2010; Wiest et al. 2015) , positive/negative (Morton et al. 2011) , local/global (Scannell and Gifford 2013; Wiest et al. 2015) , and environment, national security vs. public health (Myers et al. 2012) . Reframing policy might not be enough to alter public support (Bernauer and McGrath 2016) . This research uses the public health frame as a constant because of its ability to engage diverse audiences in responding positively to public health impacts and because health impacts can be perceived as local to the public (Maibach et al. 2010; Moser and Dilling 2011; Myers et al. 2012; Petrovic et al. 2014) . Additionally, looking at the health impacts allows abstract and possibly distant phenomena related to climate change to be comprehended on a Bhuman scale ( Dahlstrom and Ritland 2012; Dahlstrom 2014) .
The story was mainly adapted from an article that appeared in The New York Times (Gillis 2013) to include more details about environmental health impacts via air quality, sun exposure, viral spread, etc. The article doesn't reflect scientific uncertainty and instead is more akin to a Bframe of certainty^ (Olausson 2009 ), which has become the norm in recent years in the U.S. (Boykoff 2007a; Hiles and Hinnant 2014) . The Associated Press was selected so as to avoid including any identifying information in the byline that might sway participants. Additionally, having the article appear to be from a wire service, and not a known legacy news outlet, might help it appear less partisan to participants (Fico and Freedman 2004; Straubhaar et al. 2013) . A graphic designer used InDesign software to create the experimental stimuli.
Comments Across the four comment conditions, each of the seven commenters had identical gender-neutral handles (commenter nickname), discussed the same topic, and had the same length for their comments (see Appendix A). Two of the seven comments were neutral Bfillerâ bout the story content in order to increase ecological validity by not having all of the comments be the same. Only seven comments were used so they would fit on one page with the story and still be legible. The comment conditions were as follows:
1. Supported the story content and referenced anecdotal evidence in its support. 2. Supported the story content and referenced scientific evidence in its support. 3. Dissented from story content and referenced anecdotal evidence in its dissent. 4. Dissented from story content and referenced scientific evidence in its dissent.
For the anecdotal condition, commenters referred to evidence of climate change and health impacts based on their own experience, their friends or family, or anecdotal stories they'd heard about. For the scientific evidence condition, commenters referred to evidence based on studies, scientists, numbers, graphs, research, and other signifiers of empirical scientific evidence. Both conditions were based on observed practices of online commenters. The researchers chose not to use statistical evidence to increase the validity of the appearance of the online comments and to avoid issues associated with numeracy among respondents. A pilot test with 39 subjects revealed that although subjects were able to distinguish between supporting and dissenting comments, they perceived no difference between the anecdotal and scientific conditions. To remedy this problem, the first and last comments in each condition were lengthened to strengthen the manipulation.
To ensure that the manipulation was working, at the end of the post-test questionnaire, two questions asked subjects whether the commenters in the story they had read Bsupported^or Bdissented^with the story (Msupport = 4.27; Mdissent = 3.09; t(273.911) = 11.506, p < .001) and whether the commenters had used anecdotal or scientific evidence to support their position (Manecdotal = 1.22; Mscientific = 1.59; t(346.7) = −7.712, p < .001).
Before viewing the stimuli, participants answered questions about their need for cognition (Cacioppo and Petty 1982) . After, participants were asked to give feedback about the message, their uncertainty about climate change, their perception of climate change risk, and their demographics (e.g., age, gender, political ideology).
Dependent measures
Credibility To determine how subjects evaluated the credibility, or believability, of the story, a 5-item credibility index (Mayo and Leshner 2000; Meyer 1988 ) was used. Credibility was measured using a 7-point semantic differential scale with the following items: Bfair/unfair,( reversed) Bbiased/unbiased,^Baccurate/inaccurate,^Bcan be trusted/can't be trusted,^and Btells the whole story/doesn't tell the whole story.^Reliability was high (Cronbach's α = .918), so scores for the 5 items were averaged to create a single scale (M = 4.79, SD = 1.32). High scores represented higher credibility.
Uncertainty To assess uncertainty about the existence of climate change, subjects were asked to rate the following statement on a 5-point scale (1-strongly disagree; 5-strongly agree) developed by Spence et al. (2012) : BI am uncertain that climate change is really happening.^Other items from Spence et al.'s uncertainty/skepticism scale weren't used to avoid the possible conceptual overlap with skepticism. Lower scores indicate more certainty about climate change; higher scores indicate more uncertainty. Also, because of non-normality, a logarithmic (base 10) transformation of this variable was performed to reduce skewness (M = .29, SD = .24).
Risk perception Subjects' risk perception with regard to climate change was assessed with of climate change on you personally^(Cronbach's α = .933). Because the items were on different point scales, all items were transformed to 1-point scales, then averaged. Reflection and log transformation were performed to reduce skewness (M = .12, SD = .08). Because of reflection, higher values indicate lower risk perception.
Independent variables
Need for cognition Drawing on Lee and Jang (2010) , subjects' need for cognition was assessed using six items (Cacioppo and Petty 1982) such as BI would prefer complex to simple problems.^Subjects were asked to indicate how well each statement described them on a 5-point scale (1-doesn't describe me at all; 5-describes me very well). Reliability was high (Cronbach's alpha = .896), and the items were averaged to create a single scale (M = 3.44, SD = .93). High values reflect high need for cognition.
Political ideology Subjects were asked two questions-BHow politically liberal are you?â nd BHow politically conservative are you?^-to assess their political ideology. Subjects answered using a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very). Eleven outliers were deleted (subjects who rated both questions in the same way) and the political conservativeness item was reverse coded. Reliability was high (Cronbach's alpha = .89), and the items were averaged to create a single scale (M = 3.43, SD = 1.09). High values reflect more liberal ideology; low values reflect more conservative ideology.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed in SPSS22 using factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). Further, the PROCESS macro (Hayes 2013 ) was used to investigate whether need for cognition and political ideology moderated the effects of message on story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and perception of risk about climate change.
Findings
To explore the combined effects of evidence type (anecdotal vs. scientific) and argument direction (supportive vs. dissenting) on perceptions of story credibility, uncertainty about climate change, and perception of risk from climate change, three separate ANOVAs were run. Results revealed no significant main effect or interaction effect for any of the three dependent variables (RQ1).
Regarding RQ2, need for cognition alone didn't play a moderating role. There was no interaction between need for cognition and evidence type on the dependent variables.
RQ3 examined whether political ideology played a moderating role. There was an interaction between political ideology and evidence type on credibility (B = 0.25, SE = 0.12, t(3348) = 2.10, p = .03, 95 % CI = .02-.50). For more conservative participants, those exposed to anecdotal comments rated the credibility of the story significantly higher (M = 4.65) than those exposed to scientific comments (M = 4.2) (liberal ideology -1SD below the mean: B = −.45, SE = .19, t = −2.34, p = .02, 95 % CI = −.83 to −.08). However, for moderate and highly liberal participants, exposure to anecdotal versus scientific comments didn't produce a difference with regard to story credibility (p = .19 and p = .56, respectively).
There was also an interaction between political ideology and evidence type on risk perception (B = −0.02, SE = 0.007, t(3348) = − 2.49, p = .01, 95 % CI = −.03 to −.004). For more conservative participants, those exposed to anecdotal comments perceived more risk (M = 0.13) from climate change than those exposed to scientific comments (M = 0.16) (liberal ideology -1SD below the mean: B = .03, SE = .01, t = 2.60, p = .007, 95 % CI = .01 to .05). However, for moderate and highly liberal participants, exposure to anecdotal versus scientific comments didn't produce a difference with regard to perceived climate change risk (p = .18 and p = .41, respectively).
For those with low, moderate and high liberal ideology, exposure to anecdotal versus scientific comments didn't produce a difference with regard to uncertainty about climate change (p = .30, p = .13 and p = .28, respectively). In summary, different evidence types in comments didn't influence liberal participants.
Finally, to answer the fourth research question, there was a 3-way interaction among evidence type, need for cognition, and liberal ideology for the dependent variable uncertainty about climate change (B = .008, SE = .004, t(7344) = 1.96, p = .049, 95 % CI = .00-.02). For participants who were more conservative and also had low need for cognition, anecdotal evidence resulted in significantly less uncertainty about climate change (M = 0.32) compared with empirical scientific evidence (M = 0.43) (liberal ideology -1SD below the mean = 2.34: B = .10, SE = .04, t = 2.29, p = .02, 95 % CI = .015 to .19.) This holds true whether the comments disagreed with or supported the story. For those who were more liberal and who had a mean or high need for cognition, however, evidence type had no effect on uncertainty about climate change. Finally, there was no 3-way interaction between need for cognition, political ideology, and evidence type with regard to perception of story credibility and perception of risk.
Discussion
This paper offers several original findings about the disruptive nature of online comments as they relate to climate communication. Argument direction, be it supportive or dissenting, showed no effects on audience responses. The absence of a significant interaction effect for the second research question is logical in light of the results for the fourth research question. Need for cognition by itself doesn't have an effect except when taken together with a person's political ideology. If you have low need for cognition and are also more conservative, then you are less certain about climate change if exposed to anecdotal comments.
When taking into account a person's political leanings, scientific comments had the effect of diminishing story credibility among more conservative participants, but they also reduced the perception of climate change risk among more conservative participants. Again, anecdotal evidence had the opposite effect. Consistent with the tenets of exemplification theory, which posits that beliefs are modified by exposure to anecdotal occurrences, climate change risk was perceived to be greater when more conservative participants were exposed to comments that used anecdotal evidence, whether or not the comments agreed with or dissented from the article.
Importantly, comments had no influence on people who are more liberal. As identification with liberal ideology increased, the influence of evidence type evaporated. This is consistent with previous research (Leiserowitz 2006; Smith and Leiserowitz 2012; Whitmarsh 2011 ) that found liberals to have a higher perception of risk from climate change and that Democrats' global warming acceptance doesn't vary according to cable news consumption (Feldman et al. 2011 ).
Finally, findings for the last research question demonstrated that anecdotal evidence in comments could decrease uncertainty about climate change among participants with low need for cognition and who were also more conservative. Among participants whose political ideology may disincline them to believe climate change is occurring and who also prefer less effortful information processing, anecdotal comments (whether supporting or dissenting) led to more certainty about climate change. These findings offer some support for previous research that found anecdotal evidence to be more relevant or influential among participants with low need for cognition (Zillmann and Brosius 2012) . It is not far-fetched to suggest that anecdotal evidence could be an important tool in combatting the political divide that has stalled the national dialogue about climate change.
The type of anecdote appears less important than the simple appearance of anecdotal evidence. Personal anecdotes in comments could serve to personify the science and environmental impacts, causing people to look at the news story in a different way or with more attention. The Bdialogic^nature of comments may simulate interpersonal communication among commenters and thus encourage active engagement, which is a goal of effective climate communication (Moser and Dilling 2011) . Another possible explanation is that the personal nature of the anecdotal comments could appeal to individuals' neoliberal tendencies that individualize the experience of climate change for the Bconsumer citizen^ (Boykoff et al. 2009 ), which is most-often exercised in the micro-ethics of Bconsumer activism^ (Thompson 2012) . Moreover, because health impacts were discussed in the experiment, participants might be primed to look for highly individualized discourses of the self, which are popular in the neoliberal approach to health coverage (Hinnant 2009; Newman 2007; Rose 2001 ).
Limitations and future research
There are a few limitations to this study. One is that our sample of online workers through MTurk likely spends more time online and might be more inured to the effects of commenters than people who are online less.
Another limitation is that air pollution alone could cultivate concern in participants separate from concern about climate change. Although there is a reciprocal connection between air pollution and climate change, with greenhouses gases accumulating in the atmosphere and warming the air and oceans, and then with ozone concentrations increasing due to climate impacts (EPA 2011), it is possible participants aren't aware of the connection. Therefore distinct concerns about air pollution, specifically with regard to particulates, and climate change could have confounded the results.
Future research should test type of evidence in comments on other environmental and health topics or on climate stories that have been reframed to focus on the economy or on safety. Furthermore, qualitative interviews with people about how scientific evidence manages to cultivate uncertainty would be worthwhile. Whether readers have expert-fatigue, low science-literacy, low numeracy, or ambivalence about scientific research needs to be established, especially given that blind peer-reviewed journal articles are the gold standard of evidence among many journalists. The resistance toward scientific evidence shown in this study also highlights issues with the difficulty of weighing scientific evidence from different sources. It also underlines questions about the perceived accuracy of scientific evidence deployed by commenters with no clear claim to credibility.
Another finding worth further analysis is the difference between the dependent variables of climate change uncertainty and risk perceptions. If a person is uncertain about climate change, it is logical that he or she would perceive less risk from climate change. This isn't borne out by this study's data, which shows that anecdotal comments increased risk perception without raising certainty that climate change is real. A practical suggestion might be for climate communicators to focus on risk in lieu of concentrating on the actuality of climate change. Indeed, Painter (2013 Painter ( , 2015 encourages journalists to frame climate change challenge as Brisk and how to reduce it( 2015, p. 288) as a way to promote societal reflection among audience members.
On a practical level, this study's findings suggest that communicators should be aware that comments dissenting from the article's main point don't necessarily influence readers. The direction of a comment's argument alone had no effects on beliefs about the story or climate change. The power of anecdotal evidence to intensify feelings of risk and belief in climate change among certain types of people isn't surprising based on expectations put forth by exemplification theory that personal stories attract attention (Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2015; Zillmann 1999) . And the findings about scientific evidence having a dampening effect on the certainty and risk of climate change might mean that Bscientific-sounding^discourse about the environment cultivates a lack of urgency and believability in some individuals.
